From
a strategic perspective, the legacy, knowledge and headship is the bedrock
source of competitive advantage with strategic importance to a political party.
However, managing these critical resources is more difficult than expected.
As pointed out by
Pendleton Herring in his volume “Politics of Democracy” (1940: Rinehart
& Company Inc. New York) the organization of a party is spread over three
concentric rings. The centre ring represents the oligarchy in control of the
party organization—what is called the High Command. There are associated with
it, its workers who are primarily concerned with securing their livelihood
through the party organization whether as party officials or through public
office. They are called professional politicians and constitute the party
machine. Surrounding this inner group, the High Command and the party machine,
there is a large circle of persons bound to the party by ties of tradition and
emotional loyalty. They think of the principles professed by the party. They
are more concerned with its ideals and symbols than with the acts of the
professional party workers and leaders. They vote for the party ideal rather
than for the party record.
Outside this second
ring lies that vast body of people who are not attached to any party. It is a
floating population. The reason for their being unattached is either because
they are aimless, thoughtless or because they have particular interests which
are not included in the platform of any party. Those outside the second ring
constitute the most vital field of action for a political party. They are the
prize which a party must capture. To capture this prize it is not enough to
enunciate principles and formulate policies. Men are not interested in
principles and policies. But they are interested in accomplishing things. What
is necessary for a party is to bring about concerted action.
Applying
the framework from one of my old research from 2003, there are three progressively complex types of peripheries
– COURSE, CONCEPT and CONDUCT – existing between the rings. (https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-7908-2662-3_13
- Unedited pre-conference submission is
available at https://emnet.univie.ac.at/emnet-2003/conference-proceedings/
which is also mirrored at https://studylib.net/doc/8500978/mukul-p.-gupta
).
There are clearly two groups spearheading the
Programmes of the Congress party:
1) High command – handling
the development of the programme and its implementation,
2) The Party Machine –
connecting with party loyalists for and behalf of the party to propagate the
party programmes and achieve party goals.
The overall political process is to drawn up
by high-command and is to be followed by all the groups (course); the political definition and drivers (concept); and the linkages between the high-command and the party
machine and the party-loyalists that determine the outcome of the process (conduct).
Each of the three components, Course, Concept and Conduct, which make up the complete political system functionally
by integrating the two participating groups don’t create a seamless system.
Rather, there are peripheries that need to be overcome. These peripheries have
varying levels of complexity.
Peripheries are inescapable because of the hierarchical and
functional specialisation of the two groups. Additionally, since all inputs to
the political
system cannot be known in advance, these peripheries are dynamic and the
collective capabilities of the two groups would produce the final political results based on on-going inputs from
these groups that keep changing throughout the process. For example, if the high-command proposes to attack
the credibility of the incumbent PM, it
will have to assess the impact of such attack on the
party-loyalists. The party
machine will have to assess the role
of this narrative and see
how it fits with voters’ expectations especially in light of the competitive
reactions from BJP and other political parties. The dynamic nature of the different
requirements between and dependencies among the two groups brings into focus
the complexity of relationships at the periphery.
To talk meaningfully about the complexity at
periphery and the challenge of managing relationships across them, it is useful
to identify two properties of a periphery – Variance
and Reliance.
VARIANCE at
the periphery arises from variation in the
type of skills and backgrounds or amount of experience between individuals or
groups. If there is no variance between individuals or groups then the
periphery is not a consequential one.
Within the Congress party, the variance arises from variation in formal education, training, past
experience and types of methods used by the high-command and the
party-machinery.
The second property of a periphery is RELIANCE.
Reliance is a relation that exists between individuals or groups. If
there is no reliance between individuals or groups that are different then
there is no consequential periphery. For example, the reliance between
high-command and party-machinery comes with the recognition that loss of credibility
of the incumbent PM will create the need for change of a narrative
about ‘corruption in congress leadership’ because the BJP would similar to
Congress and thus trigger a new set of voter expectations. This will in turn
fetch reaction from the other political parties. But the party-machinery has
not known any political plan where it promotes any specific narratives provided
by the high-command group and doesn’t have the freedom to create any new
narratives of its choice. It could therefore be a political opportunity as well
as a competitive threat. Clearly, Reliance
across these different positions (i.e., specialised domains) is not always simple,
neutral relations, but generates consequences and sometimes conflicts. Overall,
the more Variance and Reliance there is at a given periphery
the more challenging and complex it is to cross.
The varying conditions from stable to more fluid
impact how we describe the complexity of the relations at a periphery. When Variance and Reliance are known and the conditions surrounding them are stable,
managing the periphery is straightforward. However, when new Variance and Reliance arise, managing the periphery becomes progressively more
challenging.
The Course; the Concept and the Conduct, each, are managed by a different process – RELOCATE (party-loyalists needed to understand the new mode of political narrative), RENDER
(so as to avoid problems of interpretation) and RENOVATE (reassign the jobs to party-loyalists so that they are in sync with the
new narrative and do not carry the baggage of personal relationships).
In the early phase
of launch of new political programme by the Congress party in 2016-18, the high-command wanted to place their newest
narrative
(‘CHOWKIDAR CHOR HAI’) into the hands of the voters. The problem, however, was that the new narrative for new voters buying
into this narrative came with little support from the existing party-loyalists. The party-machinery had therefore to face
unhappy new voters whose bad mouthing the congress high-command experience jeopardised future voter
conversion.
Theoretically,
political parties are agencies for the expression and execution of public
opinion but in practice parties create, direct, influence and often control
public opinion. Indeed this is the chief function of a party. For this, a party
must do two things. In the first place it must establish contact with the masses.
It must go out among the masses with its wares—its principles, policies, ideas
and candidates. In the second place it must carry on propaganda among the
masses in favour of its wares. It must animate them and enlighten them.
A party which fails to
forge concerted action has no right to call itself a party.
Which of these things
the Congress Party has done as an organization? The Congress Party has only the
High Command. It has a feeble machine of people at cross-roads. Not having a proper
machine, the high command is only a shadow. Its following is confined to that
second concentric ring consisting of persons who are bound by ties of
tradition. Is there any wonder if the Congress Party has fallen into disrepute?
The Congress Party appears to have forgotten the most elementary fact that
organization is essential for the accomplishment of any purpose and
particularly in politics where the harnessing of so many divergent elements in
a working unity is so great.
Who is responsible for
this collapse of the Congress Party in India? However much we may regret to
have to say it, it will have to be admitted that the responsibility for this
catastrophe does to some extent fall on Rahul and Sonia. Rahul
belonged to the Classes. He was born and bred among them. He never became a man
of masses. The Congress Party has no machine and the reason why it did not
forge a machine is because it did not believe in mass contact. This aversion to
mass contact is the legacy of Sonia; and it is in complete reversal to
the legacy of Nehru and Indira. In avoiding mass contact the
party is following the tradition set by Sonia. There is another legacy
of Sonia to the Congress Party and that relates to the false faith in
the driving force of her political narrative. Men are mortal. So are narratives.
It is wrong to hold that one narrative will take roots ‘ex proprio vigore.’
A narrative needs propagation as much as a plant needs watering. Both will
otherwise wither and die. But some plants will still die even with regular
watering. So will be the fate of political narratives. If the Congress high-command
is content with mere formulation of a narrative it is also because of this
tradition of Sonia.
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First published
10.10.2020
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Labels: Disruption, General, Politics, Public Discourse, Social
