Who Failed Afghanistan? Who will help it to succeed?

 

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was a multinational military mission in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. It was established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 pursuant to the Bonn Agreement, which outlined the establishment of a permanent Afghan government following the U.S. invasion in October 2001. ISAF's primary goal was to train the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and assist Afghanistan in rebuilding key government institutions, though it gradually took part in the broader war in Afghanistan against the Taliban insurgency.

ISAF's initial mandate was to secure the Afghan capital of Kabul and its surrounding area against opposition forces to facilitate the formation of the Afghan Transitional Administration headed by Hamid Karzai. In 2003, NATO took command of the mission at the request of the UN and Afghan government, marking its first deployment outside Europe and North America. Shortly thereafter the UN Security Council expanded ISAF's mission to provide and maintain security beyond the capital region. It gradually broadened its operations in four stages, and by 2006 took responsibility for the entire country; ISAF subsequently engaged in more intensive combat in southern and eastern Afghanistan.

From 2006 until 2014, NATO debate on ISAF centred around means instead of ends: how the burden of fighting should be equally distributed among the member states; what operational concepts like the “comprehensive approach” or “counterinsurgency”—often wrongly termed “strategies”—should be followed, or how to “transition” to Afghan responsibility. Pursuant to its ultimate aim of transitioning security responsibilities to Afghan forces, ISAF ceased combat operations and was disbanded in December 2014. A number of troops remained to serve a supporting and advisory role as part of its successor organization, the Resolute Support Mission.

The decision to launch a follow-on, NATO-led non-combat mission to continue supporting the development of the Afghan security forces after the end of ISAF’s mission in December 2014 was jointly agreed between Allies and partners with the Afghan government at the NATO Summit in Chicago in 2012. This commitment was reaffirmed at the Wales Summit in 2014.

Resolute Support was a NATO-led, non-combat mission. The mission was established at the invitation of the Afghan government and in accordance with United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2189 of 2014. Its purpose was to help the Afghan security forces and institutions develop the capacity to defend Afghanistan and protect its citizens in the long term. 38 Countries (Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom an United States) had posted their personnel to the mission in Afghanistan at different points in time.

In February 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed an agreement on the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan by May 2021.

On 14 April 2021, recognising that there is no military solution to the challenges Afghanistan faces, the Allies decided to start the withdrawal of RSM forces by 1 May 2021.

NATO’s assumption of ISAF command on the one hand, and ISAF expansion on the other did not go hand in hand with a total revision of the DOD’s (US Department of Defence) position. Not only the sentiments of the “unilateralist” major US but the emotions of the non-Muslim world post “9/11”, which pushed NATO to be engaged in Afghanistan as intensely as possible − even without clearly defined political goals. This was not a conscious project but an unintended result of the colluding interests of the political masters in NATO countries with those of their administrative cadres. UN was made the Accidental Front.

The Afghans now have suffered generation after generation of not just continuous warfare but humanitarian crises, one after the other, and the world has to remember that this is not a civil war that the Afghans started among themselves that the rest of the world got sucked into. This situation was triggered by an outside invasion, initially by the Soviet Union, during the Cold War, and since then the country has been a battleground for regional and global powers seeking their own security by trying to militarily intervene in Afghanistan, whether it be the United States after 2001, the C.I.A. in the nineteen-eighties, Pakistan through its support first for the Mujahedeen and later the Taliban, or Iran and its clients. To blame Afghans for not getting their act together in light of that history is just wrong.

In the nineteen-nineties, there were only three governments in the world that recognized the Taliban: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. And this time around, too, Pakistan will be one of them. It isn’t the nineties, but Pakistan is still in the same awkward place that it was last time around. The Saudis and the Emiratis have a new geopolitical outlook. But China is not the same country that it was in the nineties. How will China support Pakistan in trying to manage a second Taliban regime, especially one that may attract sanctions or other kinds of pressure from the United States and its allies is something to be watched? Flirting with Taliban will blow back on Pakistan in one way or another, be that in the form of international pressure or instability.

Biden Administration is unlikely to change its policy. US cannot reverse the Taliban’s momentum without bombing Afghanistan to shards. US can certainly take responsibility for the lion’s share of the response to this unfolding humanitarian crisis to arrest the setting in of another massive refugee flow, which could certainly have political consequences.

US does what it likes – be it in Korea, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, Iraq or Afghanistan – the rest of the countries either support or keep quiet, few feeble voices of dissent are barely audible noises. This is called - जिसकी लाठी उसकी भैंस (Literally it means, he who has the stick gets to own the buffalo or One who owns power owns everything). But what would one say to the situation when the stick-owner decides to leave the diseased buffalo in wilderness and simply run away? लाठी वाला तो इस बीमार भैंस को लाचार हालात में छोड़़कर भाग छूटा है, अब यह बेचारी बीमार भैंस किसकी जिम्मेदारी है, कौन करेगा इसकी देखभाल और तीमारदारी?

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First posted on 28 Aug 2021

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Will China review its “love-affair” with Pakistan?

A single seamless socio-economic and cultural entity before 1947, once divided into Pakistan and India, the two divisions have now completely drifted apart. Despite being neighbours, India and Pakistan are among the least integrated nations in the world. Because of their unending mutual hostility, South Asia too has become the least integrated region in the world. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is in a coma. Sadly, the most populous region in the world has also remained home to the largest number of poor people in the world.

Some 10-12 years back, we had the opportunity to discuss with the then Dean of LUMS (Lahore University of Management Sciences) Prof Zahoor Hassan, with whom we had signed an inter-institutional cooperation agreement, about mutually beneficial economic cooperation between Pakistan and India. He thought that an intense Indo-phobia among many of the influential people in Pakistan stood in the way, who called India, the enemy nation. He also referred to similar picture of Pakistan, the enemy nation, in the minds of influential people in India. Clearly, feeling of “national pride” is stronger than any feeling of brotherhood on both the sides.

After Pakistan's unprovoked attacks on India, carried out by the Dirty-tricks-wings – JeM and LeT – of the Army and Inter-Services Intelligence Agency of Pakistan, were ignored by the international community, India had no choice but to carry out its own strikes against the JeM training bases and infrastructure that were threatening her. Many of the world leaders had disregarded Pakistan's evident intentions to bleed and harm India for a long time.

Unfortunately, some news outlets and Indian politicians have been attempting to create a narrative to lead people to believe that the Pakistani threats are over exaggerated by India for internal political purposes. Pakistan establishment, however, continues to demonstrate their intentions not only with their denials, tacit support to militants as well as refusal to act upon India’s complaints. Since last 30 years or so, Pakistan has been shelling and firing across the LOC into India, and have also used proxies, such as LeT and JeM, to attack India viciously. Pakistan appears to have India solidly in its cross-hairs.

Apparently in a rush to provide cover for Pakistan, some Western countries have also, for years, been attempting to tell the public that there is a difference between "moderate" Pakistani politicians and the “army” hardliners and that the politicians are helpless before the army. Unfortunately, that distinction is make-believe and most of such countries are realising their folly in such an assumption.

China, of course, has become a new factor influencing India’s negative attitude towards Pakistan, both among policy-makers and the common people. China should value the efforts made by India for stability in the region. This is of interest not only for India but for China, too. China can become a part of the solution, rather than being perceived as a part of the India-Pakistan problem. A new ray of hope came on Monday 01 April when China claimed that "positive progress" has been made on designating Pakistan-based JeM chief Masood Azhar as a 'global terrorist' by the UN. China’s relations with India are improving yet have not become rational enough that, instead of siding with Pakistan, China would open the door to strategic cooperation with India.

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With Deterrents Turning Ineffective, India Should Now Blast Pakistan on Human Rights

After the Pulwama attack on 14 February, we in India have been attempting to deal with Pakistan’s use of terror as an instrument in its India-directed policy via few quick actions:

(1)     One preventive air-strike on one terror infrastructure of Jaish-e-Mohammad in Pakistan; with threats for more similar action;

(2)     Increasing Engagement and exchange of information with other countries to get their positive reception for India’s concerns and encourage them to exert diplomatic pressure on the Pakistani regime;

(3)     Withdrawing of the erstwhile MFN status and imposing 200 percent tariffs on imports and goods originating from Pakistan;

(4)     Announcing India’s intent of withdrawing from a water-distribution treaty signed on September 19, 1960 between India and Pakistan called The Indus Water Treaty;

and

(5)     Getting Jaish-e-Mohammad chief Masood Azhar designated as a global terrorist under the 1267 Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council (UNSC).

It appears that the Pakistan regimes – elected and the “deep state” – have not been impressed. Their air force attacked us within 30 hours after the air-strikes albeit without causing any valuable damage. Despite India embarking on a non-military deterrent policy, no credible change in the behaviour of Pakistan is seen. On the contrary, in a game of one-up-man-ship, India stands violated by an air-attack from Pakistan which was repulsed but not retaliated to by India. Possibly, India has been put under international diplomatic pressure to avoid any retaliation. The world is supposedly telling us that India and Pakistan are just on "... a very, very delicate balance." But is there really a "delicate balance?"

Indian politicians have thought they should always signal good-will gestures and release their POWs and terrorists. The civil society has been able to influence the government to adopt parallel track two diplomacy of people-to-people contact. The Indian activists have hammered and slammed the Indian army for human rights concerns in Kashmir so much that India while negotiating on various matters with Pakistan is unable to talk about appalling human rights in Pakistan occupied Kashmir and North West Pakistan.

Except for preventing a formal war since 1971, Indian policy towards Pakistan has been an abysmal failure. This policy has not prevented the 1999 Kargil. A destitute state has held one of the biggest democratic nation with a powerful economic, military and technological base, at bay, while getting away with, among other things, terror attacks at regular intervals all over India, causing embarrassment by repeatedly raising Kashmir at multilateral fora, acquiring nuclear bombs and missiles directed against India, running drugs and counterfeit Indian currency networks, supporting separatists in Kashmir, enabling infiltration and smuggling across borders, and so on. Given the imbalance in power, something is clearly wrong with India's policy towards Pakistan. It is time for a different approach.

Let us be willing to consider the possibility that the deterrence employed by India does not seem to deter Pakistan so far.  So where do we go from here?

The next move should be to see that Pakistan is hit hard on human rights. The best way to get what we want from Pakistan, whether it is renouncing terror as policy or anything else, is to reverse decades of Indian thinking and raise the issue of human rights loudly and incessantly. The same is true with regard to Pakistan's guardian and ally in the UNSC, the People's Republic of China.

Pakistan Army and the ISI know how inhumane and autocratic their “deep state” rule has been – and if we do not talk forcefully about POK, Baluchistan and NWFP, these masters of Pak games will think we are afraid of the possibility of Pakistan echoing and amplifying the voices of a few purposively-funded, pseudo-activists of India about human rights in Kashmir and elsewhere. 

Many politicians and policy activists argue for the old approach, that we must build friendly relations. They advocate using people-to-people connect for getting the support of Pakistani people for mobilising public opinion against the regime. Unfortunately, there is more than five decades of history to show that Pakistani regime is impervious to such friendly overtures and the Pakistani people afraid of the regime.

The deep state actors in Pakistan have run a militant state and do not respond in the same ways as leaders of democratic societies. Because democracies are inherently legitimate, their presidents and prime ministers often fail to realize the vulnerability resulting from the illegitimacy, and insecurity of despots such as the ISI.

In the illegitimacy and insecurity of the “deep state” has to become India’s power.  Perhaps the worst aspect of not addressing the human rights concerns in Pakistan is that it feeds into the untruths of the regime to justify its nuclear weapons programme, missiles programme and defence expenditure. The regime justifies diverting resources from its citizens to fund these programmes with the lie that India is their enemy and wants to destroy them.

The way to get what we want from Pakistan is to expose that lie and thereby separate the military regime from the elected regime, its officials and supporters, which is extremely weak. When we do not talk about our vision for a better future for Pakistani people, we inadvertently bolster regimes propaganda.

We cannot be polite or friendly with Pakistan regime. It is time to let Pakistan regime know that India no longer cares about how Pakistan feels or even about maintaining a friendly relationship with Pakistani people. That posture, a radical departure from past Indian thinking, is both more consistent with Indian objectives and a step toward a policy that Pakistan will respect.

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